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Prescribing safety features of general practice computer
systems: evaluation using simulated test cases
Bernard Fernando, Boki S P Savelyich, Anthony J Avery, Aziz Sheikh, Mike Bainbridge,
Pete Horsfield, Sheila Teasdale
Over 90% of general practices in the United Kingdom
regularly use computers for clinical care.1 These com-
puting systems contain drug interaction alerts, and
these are considered useful by most general
practitioners.2 Relatively little attention, however, has
been paid to other potential safety features for
prescribing, such as contraindication alerts. The NHS
Information Authority has regulated use of general
practice computer systems through a set of rules
known as requirements for accreditation, but these
contain only general references to safety and there is
evidence that they do not prevent contraindicated
prescribing.3
Reducing the risks of iatrogenic harm is an impor-
tant issue for the NHS, and interest has focused on
safer prescribing in primary care.4 We undertook a
laboratory based evaluation of safety features for
prescribing of the four main computing systems used
in UK primary care.5
Method and results
We used a two round Delphi approach to reach agree-
ment on the most important safety features of general
practice computer systems.5 This involved electroni-
cally circulating a list of 55 theoretically derived
statements related to safety to 22 members of a
selected multidisciplinary expert panel. Statements
related to eight broad themes covering key areas in the
medicines management process: prescriber alerts,
reports and clinical audit, user interface, repeat
prescribing, decision support, coding, monitoring, and
links to laboratories.
Over 90% of the panel judged 32 of these
statements to be important, and these were then used
to develop 18 scenarios, which were tested using
dummy patient records on the four computing
systems. The systems (labelled A, B, C, and D in order
to preserve suppliers’ anonymity) were independently
evaluated at Primary Care Information Services
(PRIMIS) laboratories by two members of the project
team. To minimise risk of bias, systems were tested
with each of the scenarios in random order and
data were recorded on to piloted data extraction
sheets.
We defined the standards against which the
computing systems were to be evaluated. These
included appropriate alerts when contraindicated
drugs or hazardous drug-drug combinations were
prescribed. For each scenario, the safety profile of the
computing system was categorised as appropriate or
inappropriate. Evaluators compared findings, and an
agreed mechanism was available for resolving
disagreements should these arise. Finally, to ensure
Responses of computer systems tested for prescribing scenarios
Test Prescribing scenario tested
Alert produced?
System A System B System C System D
1 Aspirin prescribed for child of 8 years No No No No
2 Methotrexate prescribed in pregnancy No Yes No No
3 Penicillin prescribed in patient with penicillin allergy No Yes Yes Yes
4 Oxytetracycline prescribed in a patient with renal impairment No Yes No No
5 Enalapril prescribed in patient with renal impairment No No No No
6 Microgynon 30 (combined contraceptive pill) prescribed in
patient with history of deep vein thrombosis
No No No No
7 Oxytetracycline prescribed in patient with serum creatinine of
160 mol/l
No No No No
8 Propranolol prescribed in patient with history of heart failure No No No No
9 Sumatriptan prescribed in patient with history of coronary heart
disease
No No No No
10 Naproxen prescribed in patient with history of peptic ulcer
disease
No No No No
11 Propranolol prescribed in patient with history of asthma No No No No
12 Sildenafil prescribed to patient already taking isosorbide
mononitrate
Yes Yes Yes Yes
13 Methotrexate prescribed on a daily basis No Yes No No
14 When patient requests salbutamol inhaler it should be clear
whether this has been authorised as a repeat item
Yes Yes No No
15 Repeat prescription of salbutamol inhaler issued before it is
scheduled
Yes No No No
16 Atenolol prescribed to patient taking amlodipine* Yes Yes No* No*
17 Amoxicillin prescribed to patient taking hormone replacement
therapy*
No* No* No* Yes
18 The 10 most frequently used drug pairs with similar names† No No No No
All No of appropriate alerts 4 7 4 3
*In these situations “No” was the appropriate outcome since these interactions are clinically irrelevant (but appear as spurious alerts on some systems).
†“No” was recorded if systems failed to warn prescribers about all of these drugs with similar names.
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that there were no technical set-up problems that
could have accounted for the observed failures, we
reported the problems that were identified to the
manufacturers and invited comment.
None of the systems produced alerts for all of the
18 scenarios (table). In terms of prescription of drugs
with similar names, none of the systems warned for all
10 drug pairs considered.
The evaluators produced no discrepancies in
assessing the safety of systems. Each of the four system
suppliers agreed with our assessments.
Comment
The safety features of computing systems currently
in use in about three quarters of UK general
practices have clinically important deficiencies. All
may fail to warn in a situation when a warning is
expected, thus potentially creating a health hazard to
patients.
One solution to this problem is to have more
explicit regulations about the situations in which
suppliers should implement specific alerts. Because
information technology, pharmacology, and medicine
are dynamic fields, suppliers of systems and drug data-
bases would need to have regular dialogue with end
users about ways of further improving the safety
features of these important aides to clinical manage-
ment. Our discussions with manufacturers indicate
that many of the problems uncovered could be
resolved, and this work is now being taken forward by
the National Patient Safety Agency.
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Commentary: Computer aided prescribing leaves holes in the
safety net
R E Ferner
Patients die from poor prescribing. As with so much
else, poor communication is a major culprit. Amoxil
(amoxicillin) is misread as Daonil (glibenclamide)
because of bad handwriting; 10U is interpreted as 100
[units] because of inappropriate abbreviation; patients
are overdosed with a standard release drug when a
modified release formulation was intended but not
specified.1 The prescribing process is complex, and
opportunities for error abound. Patients may be given
drugs they are allergic to, or which are contraindicated
or have already been prescribed under another name;
one drug may interact with another; the dosage, or
duration, or formulation, or route may be wrong: in
short, anything that can go wrong in prescribing will go
wrong.
Computers can help. They reduce medication error
rates by as much as 60% simply by ensuring that
prescriptions are legible, complete, and in a standard
format.2 That is encouraging, but patients still die from
the remaining errors. The NHS Information Authority
requires that systems used in general practice “shall
cross check prescriptions for known sensitivities, inter-
actions and active ingredient duplications in the
patient record. An appropriate warning to the
prescriber shall be given.”3
But GP prescribers put their trust in these systems
at their patients’ peril. Fernando and colleagues tested
four computer prescribing systems.4 One failed to
meet the NHS requirements; others failed to warn of
potentially serious prescribing errors, especially where
drugs were contraindicated. Contraindications
account for about 4% of adverse drug events in
general practice.3
The systems could be improved. They might list
every contraindication to a drug whenever it was
prescribed. That change would trap more errors but
risk overwhelming the user with alerts: primary care
physicians ignore alerts from nagging computers.5
Relevance is the key. Prescribers need not be
reminded constantly that etoricoxib is contraindicated
in inflammatory bowel disease, that nalidixic
acid should be withheld from patients with epilepsy
or porphyria, or that hyoscine-N-butylbromide should
be avoided in patients with myasthenia gravis.
Yet timely and relevant warnings will prevent
disaster. Hospital systems already exist that link
patient history, laboratory results, and prescribing
data and that present a hierarchy of warnings to
inform, advise, and occasionally forbid the prescriber
to continue.6
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